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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did The District Court err when it found that
the sentence imposed was authorized by statute?
Did The District Court fail to follow the
Laws of the state of Idaho?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant filed a Motion to correct an illegally
imposed sentence pursuant to Idaho ~riminal court Rule 35. He
Alleged that the District Court has imposed a sentence of
imprisonment upon him and that the Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to impose that sentence.
Furthermore, the Appellant is arguing that the District
Court violated theFS.iJcth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and case precedent from the United States Supreme
Court when it imposed a sentence that was more than provided for
by statute and did not provide any basis for that sentence,
nor was any factor that was used to impose that sentence, submitted
to the Jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The crimes for which the Appellant has been sentenced both
have a mandatory minimum term provided for within the Statute
itself~ and therefore it is the second paragraph of the Unified
Sentencing Act that should have been used when the sentence was
pronounced upon the Appellant.
However, the Court, at the time of the pronouncement of
the sentence, used the first paragraph of the Unified Sentencing
act, and has created an illegal sentence when doing so.
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')

IMPORTANT UNDISPUTED FACTS

1).

The Appel+ant stands convicted of two distinct and

separate offenses. The first is the crime of Rape. The Second is
the crime of Kidnaping in the 2nd degree.
2).

For the offense of 2nd degree Kidnaping, the Appell~nt

was given a sentence of 25 years. The Court further ordered that
all of the sentence
3).

1

was to be served as "fixed", or determinate.

For the Offense of Rape, the Appellant

was given a

sentence of "Fixed" life. This sentence was ordered to be served
as concurrent to the sentence for the crime of Kidnaping.
ILLEGALITY OF THE SENTENCE

At the time a criminal defendant is arraigned, under the
Sixth Amendment to the United states constitution, he has a right
to be informed of the nature as to the crime charged. This would
include being informed of any minimum and maximum sentences that
could be imposed.
This type of allocution serves many different purposes,
including allowing the defendant to be informed of the consequences
if he decides to proceed to trial.
At the time the Appellant was arraigned he was informed
that the maximum possible sentence that he was facing was a term
of "LIFE".
In the State of Idaho, when a defendant is sentenced to a
term of "LIFE" he is eligible for parole after serving 10 years
of his sentence.
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At the time the sentence was pronounced upon thecAppellant
he was given a term of "FIXED LIFE", which means that he will
never be released from prison.
It is based upon the fact that the sentence of "FIXED LIFE"
is more than what is prescribed by statute for the offense as
charged; and more than the maximum possible punishment as told
to theAAppellant at his arraignment that he is alleging that
his sentence is illegal.
In the case of Apprendi v. New Jersy, 120 s.ct. 2348, 147
L.Ed.2d 435,

(2000),

the United States Supreme Court held,

" ••• any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt by being submitted
to a jury".
There is no doubt that the punishment for the crime of
Rape can be a sentence of "LIFE".
There is also no doubt that the sentence of "FIXED .. LIFE 11
is a more severe punishment that the sentence of "LIFE".
Because the sentence of the Appellant is a sentence of
"FIXED LIFE", and because this sentence is more than what is
provided for by statute, (The statute naming that the sentence
may be a term of "LIFE"), it is submitted that because the
sentence of "FIXED LIFE" was not presented to a jury and the facts
that increased the sentence from "LIFE" to "FIXED LIFE", were
not presented to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the
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sentence is illegal as it violates the constitution of the
United States.
The Constitution requires that any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, ;
(Other than the fact of a prior conviciton), must be submitted to
a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, and the Sixth Amendment's Notice and jury
trial guarantees require that any fact other than a prior
conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in the indictment, submitted to a jµry and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Please see, Jones V. United states,.526 U.S.
227, 119 S.ct.1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311,

(1999);;

In the case before this Court, not even the ftppellant

knows

why he received a sentence of "FIXED LIFE". The Court did not make
the additional findings of fact that are required to elevate the
sentence from what is statutorily prescribed, ("LIFE"), to the
sentence that the f.A.-ppellant received, ( "FIXED LIFE").
The Appellant was never given any type of notice that he
was in jeopardy of receiving a sentence of "FIXED LIFE". At the
time of arraignment· the Appellant was informed that he could
receive a sentence of "LIFE''. (Which allows for parole eligibility
after a certain amount of time).
The State of "Idaho has recognized the difference between
a sentence of "LIFE" and "FIXED LIFE". Please see, State V. Helms,
143 Idaho 79, 137 P.3d 466, (2006); State V. Eubank, 114 Idaho
635, 759 P.2d 926, (1988).
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In those cases the Idaho State Supreme Court, and or the Idaho
State Court of Appeals-found that in order to sentence a criminal
defendant to a term of IIFIXED LIFE", the Court must find that a
sentence of fixed life is reasonable because,
· " •• the offense is so·egregious that it demands an
exceptionally severe measure of retribution and
deterrence, or if the offender is so utterly lacking in
rehabilitation potential that imprisonment until
death is the only feasible means of protecting
society ••••• Unfortunately, in making these determinations
a judge only has complete information in regard to
deterrence and retribution, which are based upon the
nature of the offense. The character of the offender
is not completely known because it may evolve over
time". Please see, State v. Eubank, Supra,.
The Appellant

herein declares that when the Court imposed a

sentence of "FIXED LIFE" upon l::lim, it did so in contradiction to
the case law from the upper Courts and also violated the United
States Constitutional provisions as guaranteed to him under the
Sixth Amendment. (The Notice requirement).
A fixed life sentence based primarily upon an evaluation of
character is acceptable only if the sentencing Court can determine
with a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator can never be
safely released into society. )?lease see, State v. Jackson, 130
Idaho

293, 939 P.2d 1372, (1997).

Because the Court did not make the necessary findings, i.e.,
that the Appellant could never be rehabilitated and that he
could never be safely released into society; and or, that the
crime the,,Appellant stands convicted of is more egregious than
any other kidnap and Rape, for.which a "FIXED LIFE" term was not
imposed, then the sentence is illegal and must be corrected.
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"A District Court has no power or authority to impose a
sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority to do
so". State V. Nelson, 966 P.2d 133, (1998); State

v.

846 P.2d 1029, (1993); State V. Wilson, 926 P.2d 712,
This

Hatfield,
(1996).

means that a Court can only pronounce upon a criminal

Defendant a sentence that is provided for by the Legislature
in a specific Statute. That if;the sentence that is imposed is
not directly found within legislative enactment, then that
sentence is illegal.
When the Idaho State Legislature enacted the Unified
Sentencing Act,

(Which is codified as §19-2513), it made very

clear and direct reference to those crimes whereas there was or
is a "Mandatory Minimum" term provided for within that particular
statute.
§19-2513,

(In the Second Paragraph), states as follows:

"If the statute carries a mandatory minimum penalty
as provided for by Statute, the courttshall specify
a minimum period of confinement consistent with such
statute." •••••
As previously stated, the Appellant stands convicted of the
offenses of Rape, and Kidnaping in the secoftd degree. The Offensse
of Rape is punishable by a term of imprisonment of One,

(1) year

to life. (There is no mention of the term "fixed Life").
Clearly the one, (1), year term is a minimum mandatory term
as mentioned in the Rape Statute.
Kidnaping in the Second Degree is punishable by a term of
imprisonment from Five, (5), years to life. Again, there is no
Opening Brief of Appellant-6

mention of a "Fixed Life" sentence.
As this Court knows, if there is no Statutory authority to
impose a particular sentence, then that sentence is not legal.
Because the crimes for which the Appellant is being sentenced
carries within the Statutory scheme for those crimes, a mandatory
minimum period of confinement, it is clear that the Court is
given it's authority to impose the sentence pursuant to the
second paragraph of the unified sentencing act.
The unified Sentencing Act, §19-2513, makes it clear that if
there is a mandatory minimum period of confinement provided for
in the Statute, then the Court SHALL specify a minimum period of
confinement that is consistent with such statute.
When the Court imposed a sentence of "Fixed Life" upon the
Appellant, that is not consistent with the mandatory minimum
period

of confinement as mentioned in the statute for the offense

of Rape.
When the Court imposed a 25 year "fixed" term for the offense
of Second Degree Kidnaping, that is not consistent with the
minimum term as provided for in that statute.
It is not some error that the Legislature did not specifically
mention the term "fixed Life" in the above statutes. It is very
clear that the Legislature does in fact recognize that a term of
"Fixed Life" is more severe than a sentence of life.
In the first degree homicide statute, the legislature made
it very clear that a term of ''Fixed Life" can be imposed, but
to do so there must be certain criteria present. If these are not
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or if these aggravating factors are not found, then the sentence
shall be "Life".
It is the Idaho State Legislature itself who has used the
term "Fixed Life" within the context of the First Degree Homicide
Statute. Perhaps more importantly, when the Legislature uses the
term "Fixed Life" it also makes it clear that a Jury must find
the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. It also makes
clear that a criminal defendant would have notice that his sentence
might be a sentence of "fixed Life".
In short, in order to impose a sentence of "fixed Life" for
a charge of First Degree Homicide, the Court,

(Or a Jury), must

find aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
It stands to no reason that for a lesser charge of Rape
that the Court could impose a sentence of "Fixed Life" and never
afford to the Defendant the same protections as those provided to
a criminal defendant who is being sentenced for a charge of
First degree Homicide.
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that a term of
"Fixed Life" is not authorized unless a Jury finds certain
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, if
the term, "Fixed Life" is not within the specific statutory
maximum term provided for by Statute, then such a term can not
be legally imposed.
The maximum term provided for, by statute, for the crimes
the Appellant stands convicted of is "LIFE". Not "Fixed Life".
The only crime the legislature has authorized a "fixed Life"
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sentence for is the crime of first degree homicide, where the
term "Fixed Life" is clearly provided for by statute.
Because the crimes for which the Appellant has been sentenced
carries within those statutes a mandatory minimum period of
confinement, the Court, pursuant to §19-2513, second paragraph,
must make the fixed term consistent with the mandatory minimum
period of confinement as provided for within the statute in
question.
This leaves the Court to impose an "Indeterminate period"
of up to life, but not a "Fixed Term 11 in that amount.
Not all crimes in the State of Idaho carries a mandatory
minimum period of confinement within the Statutes, and in those
cases the Court has total discretion to "fix" the entire amount
of the statutory maximum term.
But, because that is not thesituation before this Court, this
Court must follow the Statutory commands of the State of Idaho.
The failure of a State to follow it's own statutory commands,
may implicate a Due Process violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United states Constitution". Hicks V.
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 65 L.Ed. 2d 175, (1979); Fetterly V.
Paskett,
997 F.2d 1295, (1993); Ballard V. Estelle,
937 F.2d 453, (1991); Lambright V. Stewart, 167 F.3d 477,
(1999).
11

The statutory commands at issue in this case are the
mandatory terms of §19-2513, second paragraph, whereas it is
mandatory that if there is a minimum period of confinement in
the statute, that the court must make the minimum term of the
sentence to be consistent with that term.
Opening Brief of Appellant-9

When the sentencing court imposed a "Fixed Life" term
for the offense of Rape, that is not a consistent term to the
mandatory minimum term provided for in the Rape statute, and
it is not authorized by the laws of the State of Idaho.
The law does authorize a term of "Life", but does not
allow this term to be fixed. It is to be an indeterminate term.
The "fixed term 11 is to be consistent with the mandatory minimum
provided for in the Statute. That is a One, (1), year term. The
Court then is free to impose any amount of indeterminate
sentence, up to, and including a term of life, but it does not
have the authority to "fix" this term, as it is not provided for
by Statute.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court has imposed a sentence of "Fixed Life",
and there is no type of statutory authority to impose such a
term for the offense the Appellant is convicted of, it has
sentenced the Appellant to a term that is not authorized by
law.
Because the crimes for which the Appellant is being
sentenced, carry within those statutes a set mandatory minimum
period of confinement, the Court, when imposing the sentence,
was mandated to follow the commands of §19-2513, the second
paragraph.
Instead, when the Court imposed the sentence upon the
Appellant, the Court used the first paragraph of §19-2513,
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when it imposed the sentence upon the appellant, and under
that paragraph the sentence imposed would have been legal if
the crimes for which the Appellant was being sentenced did not
have a set mandatory minimum period of confinement named in
the statute for which the Appellant was being sentenced.
Finally, because case law from the Idaho state Supreme
Court clearly and conclusively depicts that a sentence of "Life"
and a sentence of "Fixed Life" are not the same,

(A sentence of

Fixed Life being more severe), it is clear that in order to have
imposed a sentence of "Fixed Life" upon the Appellant, he was
entitled to the Due Process Protections of Apprendi V. New Jersey,
Supra, and the beyond a reasonable doubt finding of In Re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 90

s.ct.

1068, 25 L.Ed. 2d 368, (1970).

Even for the most serious crime of First Degree Murder, the
Legislature has made it clear that to impose a sentence of
"Fixed Life" there has to be special finds made by the Court,
(If a Jury is waived), or by the Jury if the State seeks to
impose the sentence of "Fixed Life". It is also a default type
of sentence when the death penalty is sought but there are not
enough aggravating factors found to impose the death penalty.
In the above case, it is clearly named in the first degree
murder statute, §18-4004, that a sentence of "Fixed Life" can
be imposed after certain act~ons are done.
Nowhere in the Statutory scheme of Rape or of second degree
kidnaping is there a mention of a "fixed life" term, and therefore
it is not authorized, and is an illegal sentence.
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DECLARATION OF APPELLANT
Comes now, the Appellant herein, who Declares under the
United States Code, Title 28, Section 1746, that the enclosed
Opening Brief of Appellant is true and correct to the best of
his belief.

(?(_,/ /
Appellant

3 /fl
1

Dated

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Comes now, the undersigned Appellant, who does certify that
he has served the required number of copies of the enclosed
Brief, upon the parties entitled to such service by depositing
a copy of the said same in the United States Mail, first class
postage pre-paid and addressed as follows:
Clerk of the Court
Idaho State Supreme Court
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
83720-0010

Office of the Att. Gen.
Att: L. LaMont Anderson
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
83720-0101

c(2;J:J //j/
Appellant
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Dated

